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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Zimbabwean parliament passed two amendments to the Constitution of Zimbabwe on April 
19, 2000 (Amendment 16)1 and on September 14, 2005 (Amendment 17),2 authorizing the 
seizure of white-owned farmlands without compensation. Since 2000, the Zimbabwean 
government has expropriated a string of white-owned commercial lands without compensation.3 
In March 2008, in a consolidated case (Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Zimbabwe),4 79 
applicants filed an application with the Southern African Development Community Tribunal 
(SADC Tribunal) to challenge the legality of the acquisition of certain agricultural lands by the 
Zimbabwean government. On November 28, 2008, the Tribunal ruled that the expropriations of 
agricultural lands by the Zimbabwean government were illegal because they were based on racial 
discrimination and did not compensate the applicants.  
 
This paper seeks to understand the contribution that the Campbell case brings to the law on 
foreign direct investment, especially the principle that expropriations must not be discriminatory. 
Investment law generally prohibits discriminatory expropriations or nationalizations on the basis 
of race, with the notable exception of post-colonial expropriations carried out to end the 
economic domination of the nationals of the former colonial power.5 By declaring that the 
                                                
1 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 16, Act 5 of 2000. [hereinafter Amendment 16]. 
2 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 17, Act 5 of 2005. [hereinafter Amendment 17]. 
3 Constitution of Zimbabwe § 16A(1) [hereinafter Zimbabwean Constitution]: ‘In regard to the compulsory 
acquisition of agricultural land for the resettlement of people in accordance with a programme of land 
reform, the following factors shall be regarded as of ultimate and overriding importance 
(a) under colonial domination the people of Zimbabwe were unjustifiably dispossessed of their land and 
other resources without compensation;  
(b) the people consequently took up arms in order to regain their land and political sovereignty, and this 
ultimately resulted in the Independence of Zimbabwe in 1980;  
(c) the people of Zimbabwe must be enabled to reassert their rights and regain ownership of their land; 
and accordingly—  
(i) the former colonial power has an obligation to pay compensation for agricultural land compulsorily 
acquired for resettlement, through an adequate fund established for the purpose; and 
(ii) if the former colonial power fails to pay compensation through such a fund, the Government of 
Zimbabwe has no obligation to pay compensation for agricultural land compulsorily acquired for 
resettlement.’ 
4 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. and Others v. The Republic of Zimbabwe, SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007. [Hereinafter 
Campbell]. 
5 M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 398 (Cambridge University Press 2004). 
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expropriations of white-owned agricultural lands in Zimbabwe were illegal because they 
amounted to racial discrimination,6 the SADC Tribunal in Campbell appears to develop the 
investment law jurisprudence on expropriations by creating an exception to the exception. 
Accordingly, the question that this paper addresses centers on the extent to which a country can 
expropriate property as part of a general government program to correct present economic 
inequalities brought about by a colonial past. 
 
The paper starts with a presentation of the legal position on expropriations from an investment 
law vantage point and, more specifically, on the requirements that expropriations must not be 
discriminatory and that they must be for a public purpose. The paper continues with a brief of the 
Campbell case and an explanation of the contribution, if any, that the case makes to the 
jurisprudence on expropriations. The paper ends by concluding, in light of the foregoing 
discussion, whether the SADC Tribunal rightly decided the Campbell case and, if not, how the 
case could and should have been decided.  
 
 
II. EXPROPRIATIONS IN INVESTMENT LAW 
 
A. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW TO CAMPBELL 
 
To understand the change that Campbell may have brought about in foreign investment law, it is 
first necessary to verify that foreign investment law applies to the case. To start with, the SADC 
Tribunal is an international court tasked with the duty to develop SADC jurisprudence having 
regard to applicable treaties, public international law and any rules and principles of the law of 
the 15 SADC states.7 In Campbell, the SADC Tribunal used an international human rights law 
approach and not an investment law approach, though nothing forbade nor obliged it to apply 
investment law.  
 
Foreign investment law applies to Campbell because of the foreign nationality or British origins 
of the investors in some of the Zimbabwean corporations whose lands were expropriated.8 In 
Funnekotter v. Zimbabwe, a case involving Amendment 17 and the expropriations of white-
                                                
6 Campbell, supra note 4, at 53. 
7 Protocol on Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community art. 21(b). [hereinafter SADC Tribunal 
Protocol]. 
8 In Campbell, 28 private companies registered in Zimbabwe were among the Applicants. 
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owned agricultural lands in Zimbabwe, the claimants were variously of Dutch and Italian 
nationalities9 and they claimed that the Zimbabwean government violated a bilateral investment 
treaty (BIT) between the Netherlands and Zimbabwe.10  Finally, the settlement of the 
Funnekotter dispute by the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) is evidence of the application of foreign investment law. It follows from the foregoing 
that the changes or contribution that the Campbell case may have wrought on the international 
law of expropriations applies to foreign investment law as well.  
 
B. BASIC DISTINCTIONS 
 
Sornarajah, a leading foreign investment scholar and a professor at the National University of 
Singapore, distinguishes between three types of takings which are often used interchangeably, 
namely confiscation, expropriation, and nationalization.11 He states that ‘confiscation’ is the 
capricious taking of property by the rulers of the state for personal gain. ‘Expropriation’ (or 
‘compulsory acquisition’ as it is termed in the Zimbabwean Constitution) refers to the taking by 
states for an economic or public purpose whereas ‘nationalization’ refers to the across-the-board 
takings designed to end or diminish foreign investment in the economy or in sectors of the 
economy.12  
 
From Sornarajah’s basic distinctions of takings, it is evident that the fundamental issue in 
Campbell is not whether compulsory takings of commercial farms in Zimbabwe constitute illegal 
expropriations, as the SADC Tribunal and the parties frame it. Rather, the real dilemma is 
whether the compulsory takings amount to confiscations or nationalizations. 
 
Sornarajah’s basic distinctions between the different meanings of takings by the state also reveal 
that, given the across-the-board scale of takings in the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe since 
2000, it would be more accurate to characterize the Zimbabwean land redistribution measures as 
nationalization rather than expropriations. The legal implications of both nationalizations and 
expropriations are the same in a relevant respect: They both trigger compensation mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, nationalizations and expropriations have different impacts: Unlike expropriations, 
nationalizations can be crippling and devastating for a host country’s economy, as is the case for 
                                                
9 Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6) at ¶ 1 
[hereinafter Funnekotter]. 
10 Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the Republic of Zimbabwe and 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Dec. 11, 1996. 
11 M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 345ff; see also PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW: LEGAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL RISK 3 (Oceana Publications 1997). 
12 M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 346. 
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Zimbabwe.13 The nationalization that started in 2000, after the rejection of President Robert 
Mugabe’s constitutional referendum,14 resulted in Zimbabwe beating world economic records 
(highest inflation rate, smallest domestic market size, and lowest foreign direct investment).15    
 
 
C. EXPROPRIATIONS 
 
Expropriations are ‘the most severe form of interference with property,’16 even though they are 
prima facie lawful.17 States enjoy the right to expropriate or the ‘the right of eminent domain’, 
which is an entitlement that emanates from the states’ territorial sovereignty.18 Foreign 
investment law says that expropriations or nationalizations constitute a political, non-commercial 
risk that can be insured against by dint of insurance guarantees from national investment 
insurance agencies or the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). In 
foreign investment law, a ‘political risk’ is a risk faced by an investor that a host country will 
confiscate all or a portion of the investor’s property rights located in the host country.19  
 
Nonetheless, the sovereign power of states to expropriate property is not unfettered or boundless. 
States trade credibility for sovereignty, as foreign investment law not only restricts regulatory 
conduct of states to an unusual extent but also subjects it to control through compulsory 
international adjudication mechanisms,20 such as the ICSID and the SADC Tribunal. In 
particular, the power of states to expropriate is circumscribed by the requirements that the 
                                                
13 It is estimated that in 2005 the unemployment rate in Zimbabwe was in excess of 80% and in 2008 the gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rate in Zimbabwe was -12.6%: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 
2009: Zimbabwe, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ZI.html. Moreover, the 
compulsory acquisition of agricultural lands caused a steep decline in agricultural exports and shortages in hard-
currency, which in turn caused hyperinflation and chronic shortages in imported fuel, food and consumer goods. See 
Human Rights Watch, Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Mar. 2002, vol. 14 no. 1 (A). 
14 Mugabe Accepts Referendum Defeat, BBC AFRICA, Feb. 15, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/644168.stm. 
(reporting that voters in Zimbabwe rejected a constitution proposal to consolidate presidential powers and allow the 
government to confiscate white-owned land for redistribution to black farmers without compensation).  
15 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM ET AL., THE AFRICA COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2009 237 (World Economic Forum 
2009). 
16 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 89 (Oxford 
University Press 2008). 
17 M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 395. 
18 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, supra note 16, at 89. 
19 PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, supra note 11, at 1. 
20 Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility, 12 J. INT'L ECON. 
L. 507, 509 (2009). 
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expropriation serve a public purpose and that the state compensate individuals aggrieved by 
expropriation. Apart from scaring away foreign investment, a policy that would permit states to 
take property without restrictions would increase the costs of doing business in those states, like 
it did in Zimbabwe.21 Such a policy would also reduce the incentive of states to be careful about 
what they take and would dilute drastically the very idea of property ownership.22  
 
The fundamental rule of English law that property could be taken only for a public purpose and 
on payment of compensation settled in the written constitutions of most Commonwealth states23 
such as Zimbabwe,24 Botswana, Zambia and Malawi. When compensation follows a taking by 
the state, expropriations or nationalizations amount to forced sales.25 When, on the other hand, 
no compensation is paid for expropriations or nationalizations, the taking amount to a 
confiscation, as the author submits later in this paper. 
 
Therefore, for an expropriation to be legal in international law, it has to comply with the 
following requirements: 
- It must be for a public purpose; 
- it must not be discriminatory; and 
- the state must pay compensation for expropriation. 
 
These requirements form part of customary international law and must be met cumulatively,26 
which means that, if any of those requirements is violated, there is a violation of customary 
international law. Accordingly, the SADC Tribunal in Campbell sat to determine whether the 
government of Zimbabwe had complied with these three conditions. However, for the purposes 
of this paper, the next sections zero in on the public purpose and non-discrimination 
requirements. 
 
                                                
21 The Africa Competitiveness Report 2009 (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM ET AL., supra note 15, at 237) suggests that 
Zimbabwe is one of Africa’s least competitive country. 
22 See JEFFREY L. HARRISON & JULES THEEUWES, LAW AND ECONOMICS 102-103 (W.W. Norton & Company 2008). 
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2009 (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 237) also states that 
Zimbabwe has the weakest property rights protection system. 
23 TOM ALLEN, THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY IN COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTIONS 36 (Cambridge University Press 
2000). 
24 In 2002, the Commonwealth of Nations suspended Zimbabwe from membership following abuses committed 
during the land redistribution and the elections in the early 2000s. 
25 JEFFREY L. HARRISON & JULES THEEUWES, supra note 22, at 108. 
26 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, supra note 16, at 91. 
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III. REQUIREMENTS FOR LAWFUL EXPROPRIATIONS 
 
A. PUBLIC PURPOSE 
 
1. THE DOCTRINE 
 
The first requirement for a lawful expropriation is that it must be for a public purpose.27 Thus, 
while the compensation requirement makes an expropriation that is non-discriminatory and for a 
public purpose conditionally legal, an expropriation that is discriminatory or not for a public 
purpose is illegal in itself, whether or not compensation is paid.28  In Certain German Interests in 
the Polish Upper Silesia, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) defined ‘public 
purpose’ as ‘reasons of public utility, judicial liquidation and similar measures’.29 The doctrine 
probably originates from the statement by Hugo Grotius of public purpose as a limitation on the 
powers of eminent domain.30 
 
2. THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE 
 
It is still uncertain whether ‘public purpose’ is a requirement for lawful expropriations. Even 
though ‘public purpose’ is, on a preponderance of authorities, a requirement for lawful 
expropriation,31 some still maintain that ‘public purpose’ is not so much of a limitation today,32 
others go as far as declaring that it is not a requirement at all.33 Earlier authors tend to favor the 
                                                
27 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. Doc.A/5217 (Dec. 
14,1962) ¶ 4: ‘Nationalization, expropriation or requisition shall be based on grounds or reasons of public 
utility, security, or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private 
interests, both domestic and foreign;’ Texaco v. Libya (1977) 53 I.L.R. 389. 
28 PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, supra note 11, at 78. 
29 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia,1926 P.C.I.J., Series A., No. 7, p.22. 
30 M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 396. 
31 See Sabbatino v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, (1961) 193 F. Supp. 375 at 384 (held, that a nationalization in Cuba 
was invalid for want of a public purpose). 
32 M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 395. 
33 See Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 63 I.L.R. 140 (1977) 
at 194: ‘As to the contention that the said measures were politically motivated and not in pursuance of a legitimate 
public purpose, it is the general opinion in international theory that the public utility principle is not a necessary 
2009]                                     THE CONTRIBUTION OF CAMPBELL V. ZIMBABWE                                         9 
  
 
public purpose doctrine34 whereas modern authors tend to disfavor it.35 The author’s position in 
this debate is that one cannot meaningfully conceive of ‘expropriation’ without ‘public purpose’ 
for the simple reason that the definition of ‘expropriation’ subsumes ‘public purpose’. In other 
words, a taking would not even qualify as an expropriation if it is not for a public purpose. It 
therefore makes more logical sense to say that ‘public purpose’ is one of the elements definitive 
of an expropriation rather than a requirement for lawful expropriations. 
 
 
3. THE DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE 
 
Very few cases revolve on the question as to whether an expropriation is for a public purpose 
and those that do indeed address the question usually play down the significance of the public 
purpose doctrine. In James v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights declared 
that:36 
The Court, finding it natural that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in 
implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one, will respect the 
legislature’s judgment as to what is ‘in the public interest’ unless the judgment be 
manifestly without reasonable foundation. 
  
The small number of cases on the substance of ‘public purpose’ may be imputable to the fact that 
an expropriating state can effortlessly couch any taking in terms of some ‘public purpose’.37 In 
Campbell, the government of Zimbabwe had formulated the taking of white-owned commercial 
                                                                                                                                                       
requisite for the legality of a nationalization;’ Shufeldt Claim (1930) U.N.R.I.A.A. 1079 at 1095: ‘[I]t is perfectly 
competent for the Government of Guatemala to enact any decree they like and for any reasons they see fit, and such 
reasons are no concern of the Tribunal;’ Oscar Chinn Case (1934) PCfJ Series A/B, No. 63 at 79 (held, that the 
Belgian state was ‘the sole judge’ of the situation).  
34 B.A. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATIONS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 24-25 (The University Press 1959); McNair, 
The Seizure of Property and Enterprises in Indonesia, 6 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 218, 243 (1959). 
35 M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 395; GILLIAN WHITE, NATIONALISATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 150 (Stevens & 
Sons, Ltd. 1961); SAMY FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (CONTRIBUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE 
COLONIAL STUDIES) 142 (Greenwood Press 1981); C.F. AMERASINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO 
ALIENS 138 (Oxford University Press 1967). 
36 James v. United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123. 
37 M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 395ff; RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, supra note 16, at 91. 
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farms in terms of ‘land resettlement purposes,’38 which is without a doubt a legitimate 
government purpose.39  
Foreign investors seldom argue that a host state has not fulfilled the public purpose requirement 
for at least three possible reasons. First, the determination of what constitutes ‘public purpose’ is 
a political one40 and, as stated in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 
it is not subject to ‘effective re-examination by other states.’41 An international forum like the 
SADC Tribunal would be none the more effective in the re-examination exercise. Second, 
though a few arbitral tribunals elaborated on the significance of the public purpose 
requirement,42 the concept of ‘public purpose’ is generally regarded as broad, vague and 
ambiguous. Third, state regulation of private property is such a daily feature of national life that 
it is harder and harder for courts and tribunals outside the state to sit in judgment of the motives 
behind the takings by the state.43  
 
Despite the uncertainty as to its nature, the public purpose doctrine is frequently (re)affirmed in 
virtually all BITs and in the practice of states. Even in article 16 of the Lancaster House 
Constitution44 that ended colonial rule in Rhodesia,45 the circumstances under which the state 
could compulsorily acquire property in the public interest were clearly defined,46 but the 
parliament amended article 16 twice.47 Sornarajah believes that the recurrent reference to the 
public purpose doctrine may be due to the ‘compulsion to follow a time-tested formula rather 
than to any conviction that the requirement continues to have any force.’48   
 
                                                
38 Amendment 17 § 16B(2). 
39 See e.g. S.K. Amoo, The Exercise of the Rights of Sovereignty and the Laws of Expropriation of Namibia, South 
Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, in THE CONSTITUTION AT WORK: 10 YEARS OF NAMIBIAN NATIONHOOD 256, 262 
(Manfred O. Hinz et al. eds., 2002): ‘In the context of the constitutional and political history of Namibia, land 
resettlement and agrarian reform will legitimately come within the definition of public interest.’ Emphasis added. 
40 Id. at 265. 
41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW art. 712(1)(a) (1987). 
42 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, supra note 16, at 91. 
43 M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 396-97. 
44 The Lancaster House Constitution refers to the Zimbabwean Constitution as adopted at Independence in 1981. 
Since then, the Zimbabwean government has amended the Constitution several times. 
45 Rhodesia was the name of the formerly British colony of Southern Rhodesia, today’s Zimbabwe, that declared 
itself independent on 11 November 1965. The international community never recognized Rhodesia, whose 
governments were dominated by white minorities. 
46 Zimbabwean Constitution § 16(1)(a). 
47 Amendment 16 in 2000; and Amendment 17 in 2005. 
48 M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 396. 
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This section has demonstrated that the requirement that expropriation be for a public purpose is 
not so much of a restriction on expropriations. The succeeding section immediately turns to the 
analysis of the non-discrimination requirement. 
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B. DISCRIMINATORY EXPROPRIATIONS 
 
1. DISCRIMINATION 
 
From an extensive body of jurisprudence, it appears that discrimination may be defined by 
employing three equations. Discrimination has been equated with action:49 
 
(a) motivated by prejudice or ‘discriminatory intent’; 
(b) motivated by factors other than prejudice; or 
(c) which have the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging a particular group defined by 
sex or race, yet which cannot be justified by other countervailing considerations (the 
‘disparate impact’ theory of discrimination).50  
 
Though the Campbell case features all three conceptions of discrimination, the ‘disparate impact’ 
meaning of discrimination (i.e. indirect discrimination) dominates and determines the case, as the 
paper shows below. 
 
 
2. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
 
Even a furtive look at any major dictionary reveals that ‘race’ is a notion that does not easily lend 
itself to any simple or simplistic explanation,51 not to mention the inescapable tautologies that 
                                                
49 CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN, ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW xiv ff (Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited 1991). 
50 In South Africa, when courts consider an equality claim the primary issue is the impact of the discrimination, and 
not whether it treats different groups identically: Sandra Liebenberg & Michelle O’Sullivan, South Africa’s New 
Equality Legislation: A Tool for Advancing Women’s Socio-economic Equality, in EQUALITY LAW: REFLECTIONS 
FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE 70, 78 (Saras Jagwanth & Evance Kalula eds., 2001). See also NIHAL 
JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE 177 (Cambridge University Press 2002); SHADRACK B.O. GUTTO, EQUALITY AND NON-
DISCRIMINATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAW AND LAW-MAKING 127 (New Africa Books 
(Pty) Ltd. 2001). 
51 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 742 (4ed. 2006) defines ‘race’ as: 
1. each of the major divisions of humankind, based on particular physical characteristics; 
2. racial origin or the qualities associated with this; 
3. a group of people sharing the same culture or language; or 
4. a group of people or things with a common feature.    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such explanations would entail. Part of the conceptual difficulty is due to the fact that ‘race’ is 
not essential but socially constructed.52 
  
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) provides an 
authoritative legal definition of ‘racial discrimination’. Article 1 of CERD is a useful attempt to 
stabilize the meaning of ‘racial discrimination’, which it defines as:    
 
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent, or 
natural or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life. 
 
Since the SADC Treaty does not define the phrase, the SADC Tribunal and other SADC 
institutions must consider the definition of ‘racial discrimination’ in CERD.  
 
 
3. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW 
 
A racially discriminatory taking is a violation of international law. The principle against racial 
discrimination and the principle of non-discrimination in general are well-established norms of 
international law. Effectively, racial discrimination is castigated by the main international legal 
instruments, including the CERD,53 the Charter of the United Nations,54 the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),55 the United Nations (UN) Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (CCPR),56 the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR).57 Furthermore, like the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)58 and the 
                                                
52 See United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, preamble, Mar. 7, 
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. [hereinafter CERD]: ‘…any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is 
scientifically false...’ 
53 CERD art. 1. 
54 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations art. 1(3), Oct. 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI. [hereinafter UN Charter]. 
55 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 2, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. G.A.O.R., 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). [hereinafter UDHR]. 
56 United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
[hereinafter CCPR].  
57 United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993, 
U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter CESCR]. 
58 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 14, 213 
U.N.T.S. 222. 
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American Convention on Human Rights,59 the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Charter) proscribes racial discrimination.60  
 
The status of the principle against racial discrimination as a peremptory norm of international 
law is unclear and debatable. Some legal scholars suggest that there is widespread support to 
elevate anti-discrimination (including anti-apartheid) to the status of ius cogens norm, from 
which no derogation is permitted.61 Other scholars claim that racial discrimination is already a 
ius cogens principle.62  
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC),63 the regional economic community of 
Southern Africa, has an equivalent anti-discrimination provision in its constitution, the SADC 
Treaty.64 Article 6(2) of the SADC Treaty ordains that:65 
SADC and member states shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of gender, 
religion, political views, race, ethnic origin, culture, ill health, disability or such other 
ground as may be determined by the Summit. 
 
Article 6(2) of the SADC Treaty is the applicable and most relevant provision in the Campbell 
case. More precisely, the legal question in the case was whether the government of Zimbabwe 
had violated article 6(2) of the SADC Treaty by enacting and implementing Amendment 17. 
  
 
4. REMEDYING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
 
Litigation, enforcement by a regulatory agency, and contract compliance are the three main 
institutions for the redress of discrimination.66 Two other remedies may be mentioned, namely 
                                                
59 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 1(1). Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. 
No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
60 Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 2, June 27, 1981, 
21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). [hereinafter African Charter]. 
61 JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 43 (Juta & Co., Ltd. 2005). 
62 M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 398. 
63 SADC is a 15-member regional economic community. SADC member states are Angola, Botswana, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Seychelles, South Africa, the Kingdom of Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. SADC welcomed back 
Seychelles at the 28th SADC Heads of State and Government Summit in August 2008.   
64 Southern African Development Community, Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 
Aug. 17 1992, 32 I.L.M. 116 [hereinafter SADC Treaty].  
65 Id. Emphasis added. 
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providing a monetary substitute for a lost opportunity and requiring a re-run of the occasion, 
minus the discrimination.  
 
By far the most popular way of remedying instances of discrimination is by advancing members 
of a historically disadvantaged group, such as blacks and women. It is a method widely known as 
‘affirmative action’ in most countries in the world and as ‘positive action’ in the United 
Kingdom (UK). Certainly, Amendment 17 is on its surface aimed at advancing Black 
Zimbabweans. Since the white settlers themselves ‘expropriated’ the lands of Black 
Zimbabweans before the country’s Independence from the UK on April 18, 1980, Amendment 
17 sets out to even out the economic imbalances that colonialism created by expropriating lands 
acquired during the colonial days. Such provisions lay bare the homeopathic paradox of 
reversing past structural discrimination by present structural discrimination.   
 
 
5. EXCEPTIONS TO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN INVESTMENT LAW 
 
Either as an end in itself or as a means to an end, anti-discrimination is not absolute. It is limited 
by its own purposes or by a meta-principle such as substantive equality, often in the form of 
affirmation action. Thus, post-colonial expropriations carried out to end the economic 
domination of the nationals of the former colonial power are an exception to the general 
prohibition on racial discrimination in foreign investment law.67  
 
Non-discrimination or anti-discrimination can be seen in two basic ways: Either as an end in 
itself or as a means to an end.68 With the first alternative, anti-discrimination is a principle worth 
supporting in its own right and one which attempts to advance a goal different from other goals 
such as justice and equality.69 However, this is a limited principle and it is limited in scope by the 
very goal which it is advancing. With the second alternative, on the other hand, anti-
discrimination is a mediating principle, a partial translation of another principle such as 
substantive equality and justice.70 Here, anti-discrimination is open-ended, ambiguous or 
standardless, and thus in need of interpretation in light of the other principle (‘the meta-
principle’) on which it is based.71  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
66 CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN, supra note 48, at xxviff. 
67 M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 398. 
68 CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN, supra note 48, at xviii. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
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With either alternative, post-colonial expropriations to reverse the adverse economic legacies of 
colonialism are in principle legitimate and lawful. Following the comparatively recent accession 
to political independence by the Black majority in Zimbabwe (1980),72 Namibia (1990), and 
South Africa (1994), the constitutions of Zimbabwe,73 Namibia74 and South Africa75 subject 
equality to affirmative action. Affirmative action animates and inspires their respective land 
redistribution programs, which all aim to rectify the economic ills of apartheid and colonialism. 
Similarly, the constitutions of Zimbabwe76 and South Africa77 subordinate the right to private 
property to the government power to expropriate property for land redistribution purposes. 
However, depending on whether one assumes the peremptory nature of the principle against 
racial discrimination, exceptions to the general prohibition on racial discrimination violate 
international law as ius cogens norms are by definition non-derogable. David Schneiderman even 
noticed that international investment law may be counter-majoritarian and side against public 
purpose as investment rules can be viewed as a set of binding constraints designed to insulate 
economic policy from majoritarian politics.78   
 
                                                
72 The Constitution of Zimbabwe was published as a Schedule to the Zimbabwe Constitution Order 1979 (S.I. 
1979/1600 of the United Kingdom). 
73 Constitution of Zimbabwe § 23(3)(g): ‘Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be a contravention 
of [the provision prohibiting discrimination] to the extent that the law in question relates to…the 
implementation of affirmation action programmes for the protection or advancement of persons or classes 
of persons who have been previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.’  
74 Constitution of Namibia art. 23(2), Act 1 of 1990. [hereinafter Namibian Constitution]: ‘Nothing contained in [the 
article providing for the right to equality in the Namibian Constitution] shall prevent Parliament from enacting 
legislation providing directly or indirectly for the advancement of persons within Namibia who have been socially, 
economically or educationally disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws or practices, or for the implementation of 
policies and programmes aimed at redressing social, economic or educational imbalances in the Namibian society 
arising out of past discriminatory laws or practices…’ 
75 Constitution of South Africa § 9(2), Act 108 of 1996. [hereinafter South African Constitution]: ‘…To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of 
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.’  
76 Amendment 17 § 16B(2). 
77 South African Constitution § 26(4),(6),(7),(8) and (9). In particular § 26(8): ‘No provision of this section may 
impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to 
redress the results of past racial discrimination…’ Emphasis added.   
78 DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND 
DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE 3 (Cambridge University Press 2008). 
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IV. CAMPBELL V. ZIMBABWE 
 
A. THE CASE 
 
1. CORE ISSUES 
 
The questions of law in Campbell v. Zimbabwe are:79 (1) Whether the SADC Tribunal had 
jurisdiction to entertain the application; (2) whether or not the Applicants had been denied access 
to the courts in Zimbabwe (i.e. the Respondent); (3) whether or not the Applicants had been 
discriminated against on the basis of race, and (4) whether or not compensation is payable for the 
lands compulsory acquired from the Applicants by Zimbabwe. This paper, however, only 
focuses on the issue of racial discrimination. 
 
 
2. FACTS 
 
On September 14, 2005, the Zimbabwean parliament passed an amendment to the Constitution 
of Zimbabwe (Amendment 17). Section 16B(2) of Amendment 17 read in relevant part: 
‘(a) all agricultural land … [reference to national gazettes where specific agricultural 
lands for resettlement purposes are identified]…is acquired by and vested in the State 
with full title therein with effect from the appointed day or, in the case of land referred to 
in subparagraph (iii), with effect from the date it is identified in the manner specified in 
that paragraph; and 
(b) no compensation shall be payable for land referred to in paragraph (a) except for any 
improvements effected on such land before it was acquired’. 
 
Following Amendment 17, the Zimbabwean state expropriated a number of white-owned 
agricultural lands. Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited, a Zimbabwean registered company, and 
William Michael Campbell commenced legal action in the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the 
country’s highest court, challenging the acquisition of their land by the state.80 Concurrently, on 
                                                
79 Campbell, supra note 4, at 16-17. 
80 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. et al. v. The Minister of National Security Responsible for Land, Land Reform and 
Resettlement and the Attorney-General (SC 49/07)(2007). 
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October 11, 2007, the two Applicants filed an application with the SADC Tribunal challenging 
the taking by the state of their agricultural land as well as applying for interim measures in terms 
of article 28 of the Tribunal Protocol.81 On December 13, 2007, the SADC Tribunal granted the 
interim measure, which ordered Zimbabwe to refrain from taking any step or permitting any step, 
directly and indirectly, to interfere with the peaceful residence on, and beneficial use of, the land 
in question.82 On February 22, 2008, however, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe dismissed the 
two Applicants’ claims entirely.83 
 
Later, 77 other persons applied to intervene in the proceedings and applied to the Tribunal for 
interim measures, which the Tribunal both granted.84 The Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited and 
William Michael Campbell case and the cases of the 77 other Applicants were then consolidated 
into one case. Though the main hearing was set for May 28, 2008, it was postponed until 16 July.  
 
However, between these two dates, Michael Campbell, 76, one of the two early Applicants, and 
his family were brutally beaten up on their farm in Zimbabwe and allegedly forced to sign a 
paper declaring that they would withdraw the case from the SADC Tribunal.85 On June 20, 2008, 
the Applicants referred to the Tribunal the failure by Zimbabwe to comply with the Tribunal’s 
decision regarding the interim reliefs. Yet, after 28 November 2008, when the SADC Tribunal 
decided for Campbell, his home of 50 years was burnt to the ground by farm invaders in 
September 2009.86  
 
 
3. PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS 
 
                                                
81 Protocol on Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community [hereinafter SADC Protocol]. 
82 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited and Another v. The Republic of Zimbabwe, Case No. SADCT 2/07 at 8. 
83 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. et al. v. The Minister of National Security Responsible for Land, Land Reform and 
Resettlement and the Attorney-General, supra note 80. 
84 Gideon Stephanus Theron v. The Republic of Zimbabwe and Others, Case No. SADC (T) 2/08; Douglas Stuart 
Taylor-Freeme and Others v. The Republic of Zimbabwe and Others, Case No. SADC (T) 03/08; Andrew Paul 
Rosslyn Stidolph and Others v. The Republic of Zimbabwe and Others, Case No. SADC (T) 04/08; Anglesea Farm 
(Pvt) Ltd. and Others v. The Republic of Zimbabwe and Another, Case No. SADC (T) 06/08. 
85 Oliver C. Ruppel & Francois X. Bangamwabo, The SADC Tribunal: A Legal Analysis of its Mandate and Role in 
Regional Integration, in MONITORING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA YEARBOOK 2008 7 (Namibian 
Economic Policy Research Unit 2008).  
86 Dominic Chimhavi, Prize Zim Farm Attacked, NEWS24, Sept. 3, 2009, 
http://www.news24.com/Content/Africa/Zimbabwe/966/850667d917044a828d997a2869379abc/03-09-2009-10-
08/Prize_Zim_farm_attacked.  
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The Applicants were represented by one Namibian lawyer87 and three eminent and senior 
advocates from South African, 88 Zimbabwean89 and English90 bars. On the Respondent’s side, 
the government of Zimbabwe was represented by its deputy Attorney-General91 and chief law 
officer.92  
 
The Applicants deployed several arguments to buttress their main contention that Zimbabwe is in 
breach of article 6(2) of the SADC Treaty, prohibiting racial discrimination, by enacting and 
implementing Amendment 17. First, they submitted that expropriations, carried out pursuant to 
Amendment 17, were based solely or primarily on consideration of race and ethnic origin, that 
they are directed at white farmers, whether or not white farmers acquired the land during the 
colonial period or after Independence. The Applicants further argued that, even if Amendment 
17 made no reference to the race and color of the owners of the land expropriated, its legislative 
intent is clearly directed only at white farmers and has apparently no other rational 
categorization. Finally, they contended that the government of Zimbabwe expropriated the 
targeted farms and distributed them to certain senior political, judicial or military officers 
politically connected to the government. 
 
In reply to the Applicants’ submissions that Amendment 17 violated article 6(2) of the SADC 
Treaty, the government of Zimbabwe denied that its land reform program targeted white farmers 
only. It explained that the program is for the benefit of the people who were disadvantaged under 
colonialism and it is within this context that the Applicants’ farms were identified for acquisition 
by the Zimbabwean government. The farms expropriated were suitable for agricultural purposes 
and happen to be largely owned by the white Zimbabweans, who are inevitably the people most 
likely to be affected by the expropriations. According to the Zimbabwean government, such 
expropriation of land under the program cannot be attributed to racism but circumstances 
brought about by colonial history. And, contrary to the submissions by the Applicants, not only 
lands belonging to white Zimbabweans have been expropriated, but also those of the few black 
Zimbabweans who possessed large tracts of land. 
    
                                                
87 Elize M. Angula. 
88 Jeremy J. Gauntlett, SC. 
89 Adrian Phillip de Bourbon, SC. 
90 Jeffrey L. Jowell, QC. 
91 P. Machaya. 
92 Nelson Mutsonzwa. 
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4. HOLDINGS 
 
The main hearings took place in July 2008 before the SADC Tribunal at its official seat in 
Windhoek, the capital city of Namibia. It was a five-member bench,93 consisting of Isaac 
Mtambo (Malawi), Luis Mondlane (Mozambique), Dr. Rigoberto Kambovo (Angola), Dr. 
Onkemetse Tshosa (Botswana) and, as President of the Tribunal, Ariranga Pillay (Mauritius). 
Justice Mondlane delivered the majority judgment whereas Justice Tshosa handed down a brief 
dissenting opinion on the issue of racial discrimination.94 
From the outset, the SADC Tribunal noted that discrimination of whatever nature is outlawed or 
prohibited in international law.95 The Tribunal cited to several provisions in international legal 
instruments that prohibit discrimination based on race.96 It then proceeded to define racial 
discrimination, noting that the SADC Treaty neither defines racial discrimination nor offers any 
guidelines to that effect.97  The Tribunal reviewed the provisions of the CERD, the CCPR, and 
the CESCR.98 In the process, it distinguished between formal and substantive equality,99 on the 
one hand, and between direct and indirect discrimination,100 on the other. 
 
After it addressed the definition of ‘racial discrimination’, the Tribunal moved on to determine 
whether Amendment 17 fit that definition. It first observed that Amendment 17 affected all 
agricultural lands or farms occupied by the Applicants and that the Applicants are white 
farmers.101 It held that, even though Amendment 17 did not explicitly refer to white farmers, its 
implementation affects white farmers only and, consequently, constitutes indirect discrimination 
or substantive inequality.102 It added that the differentiation of treatment meted out to the 
Applicants also constitutes discrimination as the criteria for such differentiation are not 
                                                
93 The SADC Tribunal consists of ten members including the President of the Tribunal appointed from SADC 
Member States. See the official website at http://www.sadc-tribunal.org/index.php.   
94 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. and Others v. The Republic of Zimbabwe, SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007 (Tshosa, J., 
dissenting). [Hereinafter Dissenting Opinion]. 
95 Campbell, supra note 4, at 45. 
96 Campbell, supra note 4, at 45ff. 
97 Campbell, supra note, at 48ff. 
98 Id. 
99 Campbell, supra note 4, at 49-50. 
100 Campbell, supra note 4, at 50-51. 
101 Campbell, supra note 4, at 51. 
102 Campbell, supra note 4, at 52. 
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reasonable and objective but arbitrary and based primarily on considerations of race.103 The 
Tribunal concluded that, implementing Amendment 17, the government of Zimbabwe has 
discriminated against the Applicants on the basis of race and thereby violated its obligation under 
article 6(2) of the SADC Treaty.104 
      
 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE 
 
The SADC Tribunal seems to have well handled most facets of the case. It brushed a generally 
limpid picture of the events that led up to the trial; it faithfully recited the procedural history of 
the case as well as the submissions of the Applicants and the government of Zimbabwe. Further, 
it rightly and unanimously adjudicated on the issues of its own jurisdiction to hear and determine 
the case, the alleged denial of access to the courts by the Zimbabwean government and the 
payment of compensation. On all those issues, the SADC Tribunal found against the 
Zimbabwean government. 
 
It is the parts of the Campbell judgment on racial discrimination and public purpose that contain 
disputable assertions. 
 
 
1. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
 
Campbell provided the Tribunal with an excellent opportunity to develop the meaning of ‘racial 
discrimination’ in the SADC Treaty. At the same time, the issue of racial discrimination, the 
kernel of the case, defied the SADC Tribunal as a trier of fact and as a finder of law in Campbell. 
To be sure, racial discrimination was the only issue that was not unanimous as Justice 
Onkemetse Tshosa dissented with good reason from the rest of his brethren. As a trier of fact, the 
SADC Tribunal wrongly assumed that all the persons affected by Amendment 17 were white 
Zimbabwean farmers, 105 an omission that Justice Tshosa corrected.  
 
                                                
103 Campbell, supra note 4, at 53. 
104 Id. 
105 Dissenting Opinion, supra note 94, at 3-4. 
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As a finder of law, the SADC Tribunal did not adequately disentangle the difficult matters of 
discrimination and the racial ground of the alleged discrimination. As Justice Tshosa himself 
admitted:106 
I observe that during the deliberations on the case, it was not entirely clear to us how the 
issue of racial discrimination would be resolved. It was only towards the end of the 
deliberations, that is, a day before the judgment was to be delivered, that the majority 
were inclined to hold that Amendment 17 indirectly discriminated against the applicants. 
 
Something of a circular argument lies in the Tribunal’s finding that the Zimbabwean 
government’s land resettlement program, as spelt out in Amendment 17, is racially 
discriminatory because it is based on considerations of race.107 The circularity of the Tribunal’s 
finding becomes obvious when one realizes that the land resettlement policy in Zimbabwe, as in 
Namibia and South Africa, are redistributive and in the nature of affirmative action measures.108 
In most Southern African countries that achieved independence through liberation wars, colonial 
land policies and land tenure systems were the seeds of liberation struggles.109 Admittedly, 
affirmative action measures intend to bring about substantive equality by differentiating on the 
ground of race in order to offset the present effects of the race-based injustices of the past. A 
Namibian scholar once outlined the purposes of affirmative action as implying the augmentation 
of representativeness in areas dominated by the white minority and the redistribution of 
wealth.110 Therefore, to say that Amendment 17 is racially discriminatory is as redundantly 
repetitive as saying that affirmative action measures are founded on considerations of race. 
 
Once it found that race-based classifications occurred in Campbell, the SADC Tribunal should 
not have stopped its inquiry at that point. The next inquiry should have been whether or not the 
race-based discrimination is unfair.111 South African and Namibian courts would have 
investigated the fairness or otherwise of alleged discrimination.112 In foreign investment law, this 
                                                
106 Dissenting Opinion, supra note 94, 1-2. 
107 Campbell, supra note 4, at 53. 
108 Compare Zimbabwean Constitution § 23(3)(g), Namibian Constitution art. 23(2) and South African Constitution 
§ 9(2).  
109 See S.K. Amoo, supra note 39, at 265. 
110 HERBERT M. JAUCH, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN NAMIBIA: REDRESSING THE IMBALANCES OF THE PAST? 20 (New 
Namibia Books (Pty) Ltd. 1998). 
111 See Union of Refugee Women v. The Director: The Private Security Regulatory Authority 2007 4 SA 395 
(CC)(held, that discrimination against refugees (as opposed to permanent residents and citizens) is not unfair). See 
also President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v. Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC); City Council of Pretoria v. 
Walker 1998 2 SA 363 (CC); Jordan and Others v. The State (Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task Force 
and Others as Amici Curiae) 2002 6 SA 642 (CC); Volks NO v. Robinson and Others 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC). 
112 See the Namibian and South African leading cases of Müller v. President of the Republic of Namibia 1999 NR 
190 (SC) and Harksen v. Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) ¶  23.  
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inquiry would have turned on the question whether the alleged racial discrimination in Campbell 
fell under the exception to the general prohibition on racial discrimination. This further inquiry is 
necessary because not all race-conscious classifications are unfair. Indeed, some race-conscious 
classifications are imperatively mandated by the ideal of equality, and rejecting rather than 
accepting the imperative of race-conscious classifications would undermine people’s confidence 
in that ideal.113  
 
The SADC Tribunal did not actually embark on a full-fledged inquiry into the fairness of the 
allegedly discriminatory provisions of Amendment 17. Instead, after concluding that 
Amendment 17 was discriminating against the Applicants indirectly on the basis of race, Justice 
Mondlane only uttered the following dictum:114 
We wish to observe here that if: (a) the criteria adopted by the respondent in relation to 
the land reform programme had not been arbitrary but reasonable and objective; (b) fair 
compensation was paid in respect of the expropriated lands, and (c) the lands 
expropriated were indeed distributed to poor, landless and other disadvantaged and 
marginalized individuals or groups, rendering the purpose of the programme legitimate, 
the differential treatment afforded to the Applicants would not constitute racial 
discrimination.’  
 
2. PUBLIC PURPOSE 
 
The above dictum by Justice Mondlane reflects what went wrong with the SADC Tribunal’s 
rulings on racial discrimination. First, although public purpose is a definitional element and 
requirement of lawful expropriation, it does not belong to international courts like the SADC 
Tribunal to pronounce themselves on the legitimacy of a sovereign state’s legislative purposes. 
This is so despite the high probability that a challenge to an expropriation based on a claim that 
the expropriation was not for a ‘public purpose’ would possibly be effective in the case of a 
dictator, like Robert Mugabe, seizing property clearly for his or her personal use.115Second, the 
compensation of parties afflicted by expropriation is a separate requirement for lawful 
expropriations and not a benchmark for determining an expropriation’s public purpose or its 
legitimacy. 
 
Justice Mondlane’s third observation is more pertinent to the implementation of Amendment 17. 
It is a fact that the Zimbabwean government did not distribute most lands taken from white 
commercial farmers to poor, landless and other disadvantaged and marginalized Zimbabweans 
but to the adherents of the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front 
                                                
113 See WOJCIEH SADURSKY, EQUALITY AND LEGITIMACY 122 (Oxford University Press 2008). 
114 Campbell, supra note 4, at 53. Emphasis added. 
115 PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, supra note 11, at 80. 
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(ZANU-PF). It is also a fact that rhetoric by Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe and most 
tenors of the ruling clique has long been anti-British, if not downright racist.116  
 
However, while these facts justify the SADC Tribunal’s finding of indirect discrimination, it 
does not explain why the Tribunal declared that Amendment 17 violated Zimbabwe’s obligation 
under article 6(2) of the SADC Treaty not to discriminate on the basis of race.117 The Tribunal 
should have distinguished between the text of Amendment 17 and the way it was implemented 
by the Zimbabwean government. After all, that is exactly what a finding of indirect 
discrimination entails.118 As the Tribunal itself recognized, the text of Amendment 17 does not 
expressly or explicitly refer to race, ethnicity or people of a particular origin.119  
 
Moreover, conflating the purpose of the Zimbabwean parliament with that of the executive or the 
ruling party is a long stretch because, notwithstanding the fact that legislators often dissemble, 
land resettlement legislation evolved in Zimbabwe over a long period of time120 through the 
countless inputs of countless individuals and different political parties with different sectional 
interests. In cases where racial considerations are the only motives, the taking is clearly illegal, 
like Hitler’s takings of Jewish property in Germany121 and Idi Amin’s takings of Indian property 
in Uganda. But a major conundrum arises, as in Campbell, where both economic and racial 
considerations motivate a taking. In such cases, it is difficult to determine which motive prevails, 
‘for when economic nationalism is the reason for the taking both motives are present in equal 
strength.’122 In Campbell, the Tribunal could have sorted out this intricate situation by ruling that 
the enactment of Amendment 17 was not illegal while its implementation was not only illegal but 
also contrary to the statutory purpose of Amendment 17.  
 
                                                
116 For instance, ahead of a high-level visit by a European Union (EU) delegation in Zimbabwe on 11 
September 2009, Robert Mugabe told a meeting of his ZANU-PF youth party that ‘[w]e have not invited 
these bloody whites. They want to poke their nose into our own affairs.’ Jean Jacques Cornish, Mugabe 
Criticises Sanctions as Zuma Makes New Deals, RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONAL, Sept. 11, 2009, 
http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/117/article_5101.asp.    
117 Campbell, supra note 4, at 58. 
118 The SADC Tribunal used the following definition of indirect discrimination: ‘Indirect discrimination occurs 
when a law, policy, or programme does not appear to be discriminatory but has a discriminatory effect when 
implemented’. Campbell, supra note 4, at 53. No emphasis added. 
119 Campbell, supra note 4, at 51. 
120 See Consolidated Land Acquisition Act, No. 16 of 2002; Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 16, Act 5 of 
2000. 
121 Oppenheimer v. Inland Revenue Commissioner [1795] 1 All ER 538. 
122 M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 399. 
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Finally, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Thosa even disputed that the discrimination was 
indirectly racial and insisted that, for the purposes of Amendment 17, classifications only 
targeted certain lands and not certain people:123 
Amendment 17 targets agricultural land and [the Applicants] are affected not because 
they are of white origin but because they are the ones who own the land in question. 
Thus, the target of Amendment 17 is agricultural land not people of a particular racial 
origin. This means that in implementing the Amendment it was always going to affect 
those in possession of the land, be they white, black or other racial background.      
 
In this section, the paper explained in what respects the SADC Tribunal’s holdings on racial 
discrimination and public purpose were deficient. It highlighted that the SADC Tribunal could 
have differentiated between the (purpose of) Amendment 17, which is legal, and the manner in 
which the Zimbabwean government implemented it, which is illegal. The next part of the paper 
recasts the issues and puts forth an alternative way of resolving them. 
 
 
V. COMPENSATION AND UNLAWFUL NATIONALIZATIONS 
 
If, as Justice Tshosa let out, the SADC Tribunal did not know how to go about deciding the issue 
of racial discrimination, one interrogation that arises is: Why did the Tribunal not decide the case 
by relying solely on the issue of compensation? The same holds true for the issue of public 
purpose. Public purpose was not raised by the parties as an issue for the Tribunal’s 
determination, but it was an essential part of the Tribunal’s analysis of the Applicant’s claim that 
the compulsory acquisition of farmlands was based on racial discrimination. The issue of public 
purpose was also an integral part of the Zimbabwean government’s counter-claim.   
For an applicant to succeed on a claim of illegal expropriation, he or she needs to establish that a 
respondent did not satisfy at least one of the three requirements for lawful expropriations, and 
not all of them. In Funnekotter,124 the ICSID eschewed in its arbitral award the thorny questions 
of public interest and racial discrimination. Rather, it decided the case solely on the basis of 
compensation, ignoring the public interest and racial discrimination allegations raised by the 
claimants.125 
 
                                                
123 Dissenting Opinion, supra note 94, at 3. 
124 Funnekotter, supra note 9. 
125 Funnekotter, supra note 9, at ¶ 98: ‘The Tribunal will first examine whether or not the subparagraph (c) relating 
to the provisions of a just compensation has been breached. If it arrives to the conclusion that it has, it will not be 
necessary for it to consider whether, as alleged by the Claimants, the other conditions provided for in that Article or 
the provisions of Article 3 have also been breached.’  
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The SADC Tribunal could have settled the Campbell case by taking up the issue of 
compensation exclusively, especially because of the want of conclusive evidence for a finding of 
direct discrimination. The legal question would have been whether the compulsory acquisition of 
the Applicants’ agricultural lands without compensation constituted an unlawful nationalization. 
In addition, given the fact that the Zimbabwean government dished out the expropriated lands to 
the ruling party adherents, the real question would have been whether the compulsory acquisition 
of the lands without compensation resulted in confiscation.126 It appears that the facts that are 
common cause in the Campbell case would tip the balance in favor of a finding of confiscation, 
but the chief factor speaking against such a finding is that in modern times the term 
‘confiscation’ is seldom used.127  
 
The paper does not definitively answer these alternative questions, the main point here being that 
the SADC Tribunal could have broached these controversial issues by focusing exclusively on 
the requirement of compensation. 
 
 
VI. CONTRIBUTION OF CAMPBELL TO EXPROPRIATION LAW 
 
The precedental value of Campbell is equivocal on the question as to the extent to which a 
country can expropriate property to correct the economic inequalities caused by colonization. On 
the one hand, Campbell clearly creates an exception to the exception. It implies that, if they are 
based on race and do not compensate the plaintiffs, expropriations can be illegal even if they are 
part of policies aimed at redressing economic inequalities brought about by colonialism.  
On the other hand, Campbell loses sight of the general exception that post-colonial 
expropriations to redress economic inequalities are lawful. As a matter of principle, the failure by 
the SADC Tribunal to contextualize the Zimbabwean expropriations as a form of affirmative 
action policies or an exception to the general prohibition on discriminatory expropriations 
contradicts foreign investment law and creates a constitutional crisis in the SADC region. Unlike 
most African countries that achieved political independence in the 1960s, Zimbabwe, Namibia 
and South Africa are unique on the continent in that the Black majority reclaimed political power 
from the white minority fairly recently. Namibia and South Africa have provisions in their 
constitutions which exempt affirmative action policies and other measures to redress past 
injustices from the general prohibition on racial discrimination. The Campbell case creates a 
crisis by suggesting that these policies and measures potentially or actually violate their 
obligations under the SADC Treaty. The difference, however, between Zimbabwe and its 
                                                
126 See Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F 2d 699 (1992)(held, the confiscation of property in that case had a 
‘discriminatory motivation based on ethnicity’ and was illegal). 
127 M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 348: ‘In modern law…it is best to refer to takings by states as expropriation [as 
opposed to confiscation], as in most instances these takings are carried out for an economic or a public purpose’. 
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Namibian and Southern African counterparts is the orderly, gradual and procedurally fair process 
that characterizes land redistribution in Namibia and South Africa. 
 
On the issue of compensation, the SADC Tribunal rightly ruled that the absence of compensation 
for the expropriations of white-owned farmlands rendered the expropriations unlawful.128 In so 
doing, the SADC Tribunal conformed to the battered paths of international law on 
expropriations. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
So how far can Zimbabwe or other countries take and redistribute property as part of a general 
government program to redress the economic legacies of colonialism? This paper’s main 
argument is that the Campbell case gives an ambiguous, equivocal answer to that question. The 
value of Campbell as a precedent for these questions in foreign investment law is watered down 
by the partly wrong reasoning in that case. Although the outcome of Campbell is what a proper 
interpretation of the applicable law would have dictated, the process by which the Tribunal 
reached this outcome is incorrect, as far as discriminatory expropriations are concerned. In that 
sense, this paper is more like a concurring opinion more than a dissent from the Campbell 
judgment. 
 
Expropriations to redress past injustices are, as a matter of law, an exception to the non-
discrimination principle and thus legal. Nevertheless, the Zimbabwean land invasions are, as a 
matter of fact, a violation not only of foreign investment law but also of the spirit and stated 
purpose of Amendment 17.  
The Campbell case could have and would have enjoyed full precedental value if it had ruled that:  
• race-based expropriations are not unlawful, as a matter of principle, if they aim at 
redressing the economic inequalities caused by a colonial past;  
• race-based expropriations to correct the effects of colonialism are an exception to the 
non-discrimination principle; but 
• expropriations as an exception to the non-discrimination principle are unlawful if the 
expropriating state does not pay compensation to the plaintiffs (i.e. if the expropriating 
state confiscates the plaintiffs’ property). 
 
                                                
128 Campbell, supra note 4, at 57. 
